The Dan Egerstad affair

Thinking about the Dan Egerstad affair and reading the comments to the Wired article, it may very well be that he set up a Tor node and simply caught credentials when people routed unsecured POP connections through Tor and exited through his node. This makes a lot of sense. I can very well imagine embassy people, and others, using Tor because it’s a great security product, while completely misunderstanding what it’s for.

Maybe that explains why Dan is so cool about getting sued for this. Assume he set up a Tor node for non-malicious reasons, then added a sniffer to it to make sure it wasn’t being used illegally, like for child porn (the sniffer would only give useful info for those sessions that used his Tor node as an exit node, of course). So when he then checks the logs, he finds all these POP email credentials in his own logs on his own machine. He goes on to publish these, not actually using them to get into the email boxes? Has he done anything illegal? I don’t think so. People put their credentials on his machine entirely unasked and of their own volition. They even went to the trouble of installing a Tor client to be able to.

Maybe he did set the whole thing up to catch the credentials, but if he sticks to a very plausible story like the above, there’s no provable intent, is there?

I don’t know for sure this is what happened, but if it didn’t, it will.

Note: in the comment to the above article, “anonymouse” writes that it is an MITM attack using false SSL/TLS certs at the Tor exit node, but that would only be necessary if the victim used SSL protected POP connections through Tor and I don’t see why they would. If they were naive enough to think Tor would do anything at all for their email security, I don’t think they would be savvy enough to add SSL to the POP.

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